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AFTER a hiatus of four years, the Conflict of Laws Survey article
is back. This Article does not try to make up for lost ground,
instead focusing on activity during the last Survey period, from
October 1, 1997 through September 30, 1998. And, in keeping with the
spirit of a general survey, this Article devotes textual discussion only to
those developments that appreciably add to, or detract from, understand-
ing of Texas conflicts law, or otherwise merit the reader's attention.
Other not-so-noteworthy developments are either relegated to the foot-
notes or omitted altogether.
As in the past, we cover the following topics: choice of law, personal
jurisdiction, forum non conveniens, and enforcement of foreign judg-
ments. Some collateral issues within each topic may be more completely
covered elsewhere in this volume. For example, while we cover personal
jurisdiction, the Civil Procedure Survey article examines the practice of
special appearances. When another Survey article handles a particular
subject, we try to point the reader in that direction.
I. CHOICE OF LAW
Choice of law doctrines come in many shapes and sizes,' with little con-
sensus as to the best doctrine.2 Each jurisdiction is largely free to adopt
the rules or approach it prefers.3 The Texas Supreme Court has stated its
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1. See EUGENE SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 2.4 through 2.17, at 11-
44 (1992) for an overview of the various choice of law approaches. See also Gutierrez v.
Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312, 318 (Tex. 1979) (cases and commentary "reveal[ ] almost as many
theories as there are theorists"); LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICr OF LAws: FOUNDATIONS AND
FUTUR.E DIRECTIONS (1991); JAMES A. MARTIN, PERSPECTIVES ON CONFLICT OF LAws:
CHOICE OF LAW (1980); Herma Hill Kay, Theory Into Practice: Choice of Law in the
Courts, 34 MERCER L. REV. 521, 522-23(1983) ("Courts willing to consider the adoption of
new choice of law theory in the United States today are faced with a bewildering array of
academic theories, many with loyal judicial adherents.").
2. See Peters v. Peters, 634 P.2d 586, 592 (Haw. 1981) ("verdict on a generally accept-
able approach to [choice of law] is yet to be returned by the scholarly jury"). See also
Erwin v. Thomas, 506 P.2d 494, 495 (Or. 1973) ("It is with some trepidation that a court
enters the maze of choice of law in tort cases. No two authorities agree.").
3. States are loosely constrained by the due process clause of the Federal Constitu-
tion. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("nor shall any State deprive any person of life
SMU LAW REVIEW
preference, and, whether in Texas state or federal court,4 Texas choice of
law principles apply, and the generally applicable choice of law rules are
those of the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws. 5
The Second Restatement sets forth general principles that leave courts
much discretion. Over time, one would hope that Texas courts would
bring some coherence and predictability to the application of these prin-
ciples. Such an assessment is beyond the scope of this Article. Instead,
this Survey addresses particular instances in which Texas courts invoked
Texas choice of law principles. For this reason, this Article asks whether
courts are considering the proper factors and focusing upon the crucial
facts.
The Second Restatement commands a general quest for the elusive
state with the "most significant relationship" to the parties and the issues
of a particular case.6 To guide this quest, the Second Restatement offers
three levels of principles of increasing specificity. The broadest principles
are stated in section 6:
[T]he factors relevant to the choice of the applicable rule of law in-
clude (a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, (b)
the relevant policies of the forum, (c) the relevant policies of other
interested states and the relative interests of those states in determi-
nation of the particular issue, (d) the protection of justified expecta-
tions, (e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law, (f)
certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and (g) ease in the
determination and application of the law to be applied. 7
Section 6 applies to choice of law analysis in all substantive areas of law. 8
The second level principles focus on specific substantive areas, such as
torts,9 contracts, 10 and property." These general substantive provisions
liberty, or property, without due process of law"). Due process requires that the state
whose law is applied must have "a 'significant contact or significant aggregation of con-
tacts' to the claims asserted by each ... plaintiff." Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472
U.S. 797, 821-22 (1985). See also Arthur R. Miller & David Crump, Jurisdiction and Choice
of Law in Multistate Class Actions After Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 96 YALE L.J. 1,
57-67 (1986).
4. Applying its decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), the
U.S. Supreme Court has held that a federal district court exercising diversity jurisdiction
must apply the choice of law rules of the state in which it sits. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor
Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
5. See Gutierrez, 583 S.W.2d at 318. This Article addresses only those cases dealing
with interstate choice of law. Thus, cases dealing with either federal pre-emption of state
law or choices between federal and state law are not covered.
6. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLIcr OF LAWS §§ 145(1), 187(1) (1971)
[hereinafter SECOND RESTATEMENT]. Courts undertake choice of law analysis under the
Second Restatement only in the absence of a statutory directive regarding the applicable
law. See id. at § 6(1) ("A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory
directive of its own state on choice of law."); see, e.g., TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§§ 1.105 (general choice of law rule for the Texas version of the Uniform Commercial
Code) and 4A.507 (choice of law for certain funds transfers) (Vernon 1994).
7. SECOND RESTATEMENT § 6 (emphasis added).
8. Except where a specific statute sets forth the applicable choice of law rule. See id.
9. See id. § 145.
10. See id. § 188.
11. See id. § 222.
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provide additional factors for consideration along with the factors in sec-
tion 6. For example, section 145 lists the following factors in torts cases:
"(a) the place where the injury occurred, (b) the place where the conduct
causing the injury occurred, (c) the domicil, residence, nationality, place
of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and (d) the place
where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered." 12 The
section 145 factors are to be weighed with the section 6 factors in deter-
mining the state with the "most significant relationship to the parties and
the transaction." 13
The Second Restatement's third level principles apply to specific issues
within a substantive area.14 For example, within torts, the Second Re-
statement has third level rules for the standard of care, 15 the duty owed to
the plaintiff,16 and contributory negligence 17 and assumption of the risk.18
These third level principles erect a sort of presumption in favor of a par-
ticular state's law. This presumption determines the applicable law unless
"some other state has a more significant relationship under the principles
stated in [section] 6 to the transaction and the parties, in which event the
local law of the other state will be applied."1 9 The third level principles,
then, act as rules-of-thumb for identifying the state with the most signifi-
cant relationship to a particular issue. These rules-of-thumb, however,
may give way to a particularized, "more significant relationship" analysis
based on the first and second level principles. 20
The Texas Supreme Court appears to have a specific method for ana-
lyzing the Second Restatement's three levels of principles.21 The Court
begins by identifying a specific third-level provision, if any, that addresses
the specific issues raised. If the Court finds an applicable third level pro-
vision, a strong presumption exists in favor of the law chosen by the third-
12. Id. § 145(2).
13. Id. § 145(1).
14. By providing different choice of law principles for different issues of law, the Sec-
ond Restatement allows the possibility that different issues in the same case may be gov-
erned by the law of different states. See SCOLES & HAY, supra note 1, § 3.16, at 74. This
"issue-by-issue approach in choice of law" is known as "depecage." Id. This author has
not identified a Texas case addressing the doctrine of depecage. Other states, however,
have employed the concept. See Bryant v. Silverman, 703 P.2d 1190, 1193 n.l (Ariz. 1985);
Stutsman v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of the Mid-Atlantic States, Inc., 546 A.2d 367, 373
(D.C. 1988); Buchanan v. Doe, 431 S.E.2d 289, 291 (Va. 1993); Hunker v. Royal Indemn.
Co., 204 N.W.2d 895, 905 n.1 (Wis. 1973). See also Willis L. M. Reese, Depecage: A Com-
mon Phenomenon in Choice of Law, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 58 (1973); Christian L. Wilde,
Depecage in the Choice of Tort Law, 41 S. CAL. L. REV. 329, 329 n.3 (1968).
15. SECOND RESTATEMENT § 157.
16. See id. § 159.
17. See id. § 164.
18. See id. § 165.
19. See, e.g., id. § 196 (emphasis added).
20. See WILLIAM M. RICHMAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, UNDERSTANDING CON-
FLICT OF LAWS § 59[d], at 160 (1984) (the "more significant relationship" exception to the
third level principles "builds flexibility into the system, providing an escape device for
judges.").




Next, regardless of whether a third-level principle exists, the court
identifies the applicable second-level provision and analyzes the factors
of this provision along with the factors of section 6. This analysis deter-
mines the state with the "most/more significant relationship. ' 23 If no
third-level provision applies, the second-level provision and section 6 de-
termine the applicable law.
If, on the other hand, a third level provision and the "more significant
relationship" analysis select different states, the court must decide
whether the second-level and section 6 factors overcome the third-level
presumption in favor of the other state's law. Unfortunately, the Second
Restatement provides little guidance on this issue, and only a periodic
examination of the cases-as done in this Survey-can provide helpful
guidance.
A. CHOICE OF LAW UNDER THE TEXAS UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE
The Texas Uniform Commercial Code contains its own choice of law
provision. Section 1.105(a) 24 provides:
Except as provided hereafter in this section, when a transaction
bears a reasonable relation to this state and also to another state or
nation the parties may agree that the law either of this state or of
such other state or nation shall govern their rights and duties. Failing
such agreement this title applies to transactions bearing an appropri-
ate relation to this state.25
22. See DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 679 (Tex. 1990), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 1048 (1991) (The third level principle "[a]s a rule .... is conclusive in determining
what state's law is to apply."); see also Maxus, 817 S.W.2d at 54. If courts did not apply a
strong presumption in favor of the state selected by a third level provision, such provisions
would become largely superfluous. In other words, if the general "most significant rela-
tionship" analysis always overrode the third level analysis, why not simply drop the third
level analysis? The answer lies in the description of the third level principles heuristic
devices intended to identify the state with the most significant relationship. In other
words, the drafters of the Second Restatement have distilled the first and second level
factors in relation to a specific issue of law, and have determined that the factors will, on
average, reduce to a single consideration reflected in the third level provision. For exam-
ple, in torts, the issue of the standard of care will generally reduce to consideration of the
place of injury. See SECOND RESTATEMENT § 157. In other words, when analyzing choice
of law for the standard of care, the section 145 torts factors along with the general section 6
factors generally points towards the state where the injury occurred. Thus, section 157
embodies that shorthand rule. Yet, section 157 recognizes that particular factual situations
may require a different result. Thus, flexibility is allowed by the "more significant relation-
ship" analysis.
23. Some third level provisions, however, do not provide for consideration of the state
with a "more significant relationship" to override the choice of law rule in the third level
principle. See SECOND RESTATEMENT §§ 223-43 (law governing transfers of interests in
land taken from situs of the property).
24. The remaining subsections provide special rules for specific types of transactions.
See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.105(b) & (c) (Vernon 1994 &'1998 Supp.).
25. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.105(a) (Vernon 1994) (emphasis added).
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This provision distinguishes between transactions where the parties'
contract selects the applicable law and transactions where the parties'
contract does not. If the parties' contract selects the applicable law, that
law controls if the chosen state has a "reasonable relation" to the transac-
tion. If the parties' contract does not, Texas law applies if the transaction
has an "appropriate relation" to Texas.
J. Parra e Hijos, S.A. v. Barroso26 involved a transaction in which the
parties had not contractually selected a state's law. A Mexican corpora-
tion had sued to recover money owed for goods sold to a Texas corpora-
tion, and the question was whether Texas or Mexico law applied to the
dispute. Section 1.105(a) was the applicable choice of law rule because
the transaction involved a sale of goods within Article 2 of the UCC.
Since the parties had not made a contractual choice of law, section
1.105 required application of the Texas UCC if Texas has an "appropriate
relation" to the parties' transaction. 27 The Texas UCC does not further
define "appropriate relation," and, as the court explained, the issue "is
not clarified by our state's jurisprudence. '28 The court's task was further
complicated by the somewhat-even distribution of contacts between Mex-
ico and Texas. 29 The court ultimately broke the tie based on a single
contact: the plaintiff had filed suit in Texas. 30 The court did not explain
why this contact was dispositive, and it is not clear why this contact
should receive special weight under the Texas UCC. Regardless, in the
Beaumont court of appeals, simply filing suit in Texas state court may
select Texas law.
B. PARTIES' CONTRACTUAL CHOICE OF LAW
In Lemmon v. United Waste Systems, Inc.,31 the court of appeals ana-
lyzed a contractual choice of law provision in an employer-employee dis-
pute. Lemmon involved an employee's suit for wrongful termination,
breach of employment contract, promissory estoppel, and breach of a
post-termination oral agreement. The employee's written employment
contract allowed termination for "good cause" or without cause if the
employer paid a severance package. The employer later terminated the
employee for cause and the employee disputed the action. The employer
and the employee then began post-termination negotiations, with the em-
ployee claiming that an oral agreement was reached. The employee's suit
claims that the employer breached the oral post-termination agreement.
The issue was which states law applied to the employee's claims.
26. 960 S.W.2d 161 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997, no pet.).
27. See id. at 167.
28. Id. The comments to the Texas UCC were equally unhelpful, merely noting that
what constitutes an "appropriate relation" is left to "judicial decision." TEx. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 1.105 cmt. 3 (Vernon 1994).
29. See Barroso, 960 S.W.2d at 167.
30. See id.
31. 958 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1997, writ denied).
1999]
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A clause of the written employment contract selected New York law.
The first issue for the court of appeals, then, was whether the parties'
contractual choice of law should settle the issue. The court began its
analysis with a rough statement of Texas law on the issue. The court de-
rived its rule from the Texas Supreme Court case DeSantis v. Wackenhut
Corp.,32 which adopted section 187 of the Second Restatement for re-
viewing contractual choice of law clauses. The court of appeals para-
phrased that rule as follows: "Under the concept of 'party autonomy,' we
respect the parties' choice of law unless the chosen law has no relation to
the parties or the agreement, or their choice would offend the public pol-
icy of the state whose laws otherwise ought to apply. '33 As discussed
below, while not entirely accurate, this quote captures most of the Texas
rule. Based on this rule, the court concluded that the parties had un-
equivocally chosen New York law, and that "neither party had contested
application of New York law under the DeSantis framework. ' 34 Thus,
New York law applied.
While Lemmon is a fairly unremarkable and straightforward case, it
raises two points that are worth further discussion. First, the court of
appeals made a common error in setting forth Texas choice of law rules
that could cause confusion in future cases, even though it did not affect
the outcome in this case. The court started on the right foot when it
stated that Texas generally follows section 187 of the Second Restatement
to determine whether the parties' contractual choice of law should be
enforced. Section 187 provides in full:
Law of the State Chosen by the Parties
(1) The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their con-
tractual rights and duties will be applied if the particular issue is one
which the parties could have resolved by an explicit provision in their
agreement directed to that issue.
(2) The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their con-
tractual rights and duties will be applied, even if the particular issue
is one which the parties could not have resolved by an explicit provi-
sion in their agreement directed to that issue, unless either:
(a) the chosen state has no substantial relationship to the parties or
the transaction and there is no other reasonable basis for the parties'
choice, or
(b) application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary to a
fundamental policy of a state which has a materially greater interest
than the chosen state in the determination of the particular issue and
which, under the rule of § 188 [the general contract choice of law
rule discussed in the preceding section], would be the state of the
applicable law in the absence of an effective choice of law by the
parties.
32. 793 S.W.2d 670 (Tex. 1990).
33. Lemmon, 958 S.W.2d at 498.
34. Id. at 499.
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(3) In the absence of a contrary indication of intention, the refer-
ence is to the local law of the state of the chosen law. 35
Section 187 has two main parts, set forth in subsections (1) and (2)
respectively. Subsection (1) grants blanket approval of the parties' choice
of law if the issue involved is one the parties could have resolved in their
contract. This rule allows the parties to incorporate a rule of law into
their contract instead of actually adding extra language to the contract.
As comment c to section 187 explains:
The parties, generally speaking, have power to determine the terms
of their contractual engagements. They may spell out these terms in
the contract. In the alternative, they may incorporate into the con-
tract by reference extrinsic material which may, among other things,
be the provisions of some foreign law. In such instances, the forum
will apply the applicable provisions of the law of the designated state
in order to effectuate the intentions of the parties. 36
For example, instead of drafting a contract clause that requires each
party to perform the contract in good faith, the parties could simply
choose the law of a state that requires good faith performance of contrac-
tual obligations. 37 In these situations, the choice of law clause is just an-
other tool in drafting the agreement to reflect the parties' intent.
Subsection (2) addresses the case where the issue is not one that the
parties could have resolved in their agreement. The most common exam-
ple of such an issue is the validity of the agreement itself.38 When such an
issue is involved, the parties may still choose the applicable law, but only
if neither subsection (2)(a) nor (b) is triggered. Subsection (2)(a) avoids
the parties' choice of law if the chosen state has "no substantial relation-
ship to the parties or the transaction and there is no other reasonable
basis for the parties' choice."' 39 Subsection (2)(b) avoids the parties
choice of law if the law of the chosen state violates a "fundamental pol-
icy" of the state whose law would otherwise apply, which is usually
Texas.40 If either subsection (2)(a) or (b) is triggered, the court should
not enforce the parties' contractual choice of law.
Section 187, then, sets forth a number of detailed rules for reviewing a
parties' choice of law, and the court of appeals correctly identified it as
the applicable rule. The court, however, then took a wrong turn when it
stated that the Texas legislature had "codified" DeSantis and its adoption
of section 187 in section 1.105(a) of the Texas Business and Commerce
Code. Section 1.105(a),41 also discussed in the preceding section, pro-
35. SECOND RESTATEMENT § 187 (emphasis added).
36. See id. cmt. c.
37. Comment c gives other examples: "rules relating to construction, to conditions
precedent and subsequent, to sufficiency of performance and to excuse for nonperform-
ance, including questions of frustration and impossibility." Id.
38. See id. cmt. d. ("Examples of such questions are those involving capacity, formali-
ties and substantial validity").
39. Id. § 187(2)(a).
40. See id. § 187(2)(b).
41. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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vides: "[W]hen a transaction bears a reasonable relation to this state and
also to another state or nation the parties may agree that the law either of
this state or of such other state or nation shall govern their rights or du-
ties."'42 Lemmon's claim that section 1.105(a) codifies DeSantis is wrong
for three reasons; each reason is considered in turn.
First, since section 1.105 was passed before the Texas Supreme Court
decided DeSantis, it is hard to see how section 1.105(a) codified the hold-
ing of that case. Section 1.105(a) is verbatim the Uniform Commercial
Code as promulgated by the American Law Institute and the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.43 The UCC was
promulgated in 1967, and Texas adopted its version of the UCC, including
section 1.105, in 1971; and section 1.105(a) has not been amended since.44
DeSantis, however, was decided in 1990. Thus, it makes no sense to find
that section 1.105 codified DeSantis.
Second, the legislative history of section 1.105 shows that it was not
meant to codify any part of Texas law, even cases that might have fore-
shadowed DeSantis.4 5 As noted above, section 1.105 is verbatim the
UCC, and the Texas legislature enacted that section without any substan-
tive changes to its text or comments.4 6 The necessary implication is that
section 1.105 is part of a unified code drafted on its own that sets forth
the choice of law rule for transactions.4 7 Section 1.105 does not on its
terms apply to non-UCC transactions and was not enacted in response to,
or to reflect any, specific rule of Texas law.
42. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.105(a) (Vernon 1994). The court also set forth
the Texas Supreme Court's prior statement of the rule, taken from the Second Restate-
ment § 187, established in DeSantis: "[W]e respect the parties' choice of law unless the
chosen law has no relation to the parties or the agreement, or their choice would offend the
public policy of the state whose laws otherwise ought to apply." Lemmon, 958 S.W.2d at
498; see also DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 677.
43. UCC § 1-105 (1967).
44. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.105 (Vernon 1994).
45. Of course, it is temporally plausible to argue that section 1.105 codified Texas case
law that pre-existed adoption of the Texas UCC. For example, the Eastland Court of Civil
Appeals opined that section 1.105 codified the holding of an 1891 Texas Supreme Court
case. See Walker v. Associates Fin. Servs. Corp., 588 S.W. 2d 416, 417 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Eastland 1979) (citing Dugan v. Lewis, 14 S.W. 1024 (1891)). There are still two problems
with such an argument. First, the Texas Supreme Court has gradually adopted the Second
Restatement's choice of law rules in a series of cases decided after adoption of section
1.105. Thus, section 1.105 could not be a codification of the court's current, evolving choice
of law rules. Second, as is discussed below, the legislative history of the Texas UCC
strongly suggests that section 1.105 was not intended to codify any existing Texas law.
46. Section 1-105(1) of the UCC reads as follows:
Except as provided hereafter in this section, when a transaction bears a rea-
sonable relation to this state and also to another state or nation the parties
may agree that the law either of this state or of such other state or nation
shall govern their rights and duties. Failing such agreement this Act applies
to transactions bearing an appropriate relation to this state.
UCC § 1-105(1) (1978).
47. See SCOLES & HAY, supra note 1, § 18; Thomas W. Pounds, Party Autonomy-Past




Third, the rule in section 1.105 substantially differs from the rule set
forth in section 187 of the Second Restatement. Section 187 allows the
parties to choose a state's law, regardless of the relationship with that
state, if the parties could have resolved the issue in their agreement. Sec-
tion 1.105 does not have a similar allowance.4 8 Section 187 will uphold a
choice of law provision if "the chosen state has [a] substantial relationship
to the parties or the transaction"; section 1.105 merely requires "a reason-
able relation. ' 49 And, section 187 says that the parties' choice of law
need not be honored where the law of the chosen state offends a funda-
mental public policy of the state whose law would otherwise apply. Sec-
tion 1.105 has no such exception.50 Section 1.105, then, would be a very
poor attempt to codify section 187 of the Second Restatement.
On the whole, then, section 1.105 should not be read to codify DeSantis
and section 187. Lemmon and other court of appeals cases, however,
have done so without explanation. 51 But why? One reason might be that
these courts of appeals have misread a passage from the Texas Supreme
Court's opinion in DeSantis.
In DeSantis, the Texas Supreme Court had to decide "what effect
should be given to contractual choice of law provisions. ' 52 The court be-
gan its analysis by noting that conflicts law generally recognizes the right
of contracting parties, within certain limits, to choose the applicable
law.53 This right generally belongs under the heading of "party auton-
omy." Next, the court addressed whether the principle of party auton-
omy had any support in Texas law. It is this discussion that may be the
source of current confusion. The court reasoned:
The party autonomy rule has been recognized in this state. The Leg-
islature has provided in the Uniform Commercial Code ... [(quotes
48. While cmt. 1 to section 1.105 suggests that the parties may do so, see TEX. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. § 1.105, cmt. 1 (Tex. UCC 1971) ("an agreement as to choice of law may
sometimes take effect as a shorthand expression of the intent of the parties as to matters
governed by their agreement, even though the transaction has no significant contact with
the jurisdiction chosen."). The courts split on whether section 1-105 should be read to
allow the parties to do so. See SCOLES & HAY, supra note 1, §18.12, at 677.
49. See SECOND RESTATEMENT § 187; TEX. Bus & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.105 (Vernon
1994). Of course, it is a question of statutory interpretation whether a "reasonable rela-
tion" requires more, less, or substantially the same connection between the chosen state
and the parties' transaction.
50. See SCOLES & HAY, supra note 1, § 18.12, at 677.
51. See, e.g., Salazar v. Coastal Corp., 928 S.W.2d 162, 166 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1996, n.w.h.); First Commerce Realty Investors v. K-F Land Co., 617 S.W.2d 806, 809
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see Walker v. Associates Fin.
Servs. Corp., 588 S.W.2d 416, 417-18 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Hi
Fashion Wigs Profit Sharing Trust v. Hamilton Inv. Trust, 579 S.W.2d 300, 302 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Eastland 1979, n.w.h.). The Dallas and Forth Worth courts seem to have avoided
this problem, properly invoking section 1.105 in a UCC case and not contending that the
section codifies prior Texas law. See Mostek Corp. v. Chemerton Corp., 642 S.W.2d 20, 23
(Tex. App.-Dallas 1982, writ dism'd by agr.); Cook v. Frazier, 765 S.W.2d 546, 551 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 1989, n.w.h.) ("The contracts at issue involve the sale of land. The
Texas Business and Commerce Code is not applicable.").




section 1.105)]. In a different context, one court of appeals has elabo-
rated further ... [(quoting court of appeals)]. We believe the rule is
best formulated in section 187 of the Restatement and will therefore
look to its provisions in our analysis of this case.54
Several courts of appeals have read this passage to say that section
1.105 codifies section 187 of the Second Restatement. 55 These courts,
however, misread the preceding passage. In that passage, the Texas
Supreme Court is saying (1) parts of Texas law have recognized the prin-
ciple of party autonomy, (2) for example, in the UCC context, section
1.105 sets forth a version of the party autonomy rule, (3) outside the UCC
context, one court of appeals had recognized the principle, (4) the Texas
Supreme Court recognized the principle, and (5) the Texas Supreme
Court adopts section 187 to implement the principle. As this chain of
reasoning reveals, the Texas Supreme Court cited section 1.105 as an il-
lustration of Texas law that embraced party autonomy, not as the applica-
ble rule. Indeed, the passage states that section 1.105 operated in "a
different context" from DeSantis. This makes sense because section 1.105
governs choice of law for UCC issues, and DeSantis did not involve any
UCC questions. Thus, DeSantis does not interpret section 1.105(a) to
codify section 187 of the Second Restatement.
While section 1.105(a) does not codify DeSantis, it is still possible that
the rule in DeSantis could apply to UCC choice of law cases. Whether
DeSantis and the Second Restatement approach should be read into sec-
tion 1.105 depends on the answers to several questions that Texas courts
have yet to address. For example, courts could interpret section 1.105's
requirement of a "reasonable relation" to have the same meaning as sec-
tion 187's "substantial relationship." Or, courts could rely on section
1.103 of the Texas UCC, which allows courts to "supplement" the UCC
with the common law, to incorporate general choice of law rules into the
UCC context. 56 For example, courts could supplement section 1.105 with
the section 187 requirement that the law of the chosen state not violate a
fundamental policy of the state whose law would otherwise apply.57 Re-
gardless of whether and how the courts address such issues, two things
should remain clear: (1) section 1.105 applies to UCC issues, and (2) if
the courts wish to import non-UCC choice of law rules into the UCC
context, they must explain why doing so makes sense.
. Turford v. Underwood58 illustrates an important exception to the par-
ties' power to contractually choose the applicable law. Turford involved a
special thorn in the side of Texas employment law, the covenant not to
54. Id. (emphasis added).
55. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
56. See Scots & HAY, supra note 1, § 18.12, at 676 ("There is a split of authority and
opinion concerning the question whether the section [§ 1-105] adopts and restates the com-
mon law or whether it modifies and departs from it, except for purposes of gap-filling.").
57. See id. at 677 ("At least one court has read the traditional public policy limitation
into § 1-105.").
58. 952 S.W.2d 641 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1997, n.w.h.).
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compete. An employee sought a declaration invalidating the non-com-
pete clause in the employment contract with his former employer. The
agreement containing the non-compete clause also contained an agree-
ment to arbitrate and a clause selecting Michigan law. Under the arbitra-
tion clause, the employer moved to compel arbitration and the trial court
granted the motion. The employee then sought a writ of mandamus to
overturn the order compelling arbitration, making four arguments: (1)
the arbitration agreement was invalid, (2) his claims were outside the
scope of the arbitration agreement, (3) a condition precedent to the arbi-
tration proceedings had not occurred, and (4) that the employer had
waived arbitration by participating in the trial court proceedings.59
On appeal, the question was whether Texas or Michigan law applied to
the employee's four arguments against arbitration. To decide this ques-
tion, the court applied section 187 of the Second Restatement, as re-
quired by DeSantis60 Under section 187 a court will enforce the parties'
contractual choice of law only if (1) the issue was one that the parties
could have resolved in their contract, or (2) the chosen state was signifi-
cantly related to the parties' transaction and the law of the chosen juris-
diction did not violate a fundamental policy of the jurisdiction whose law
would otherwise apply.61 Presumably, this test would be applied to each
of the employee's four arguments. The court of appeals, however, ap-
plied section 187 to only one of those issues-whether the agreement was
valid. Thus, the single issue of the validity decided what law would apply
to the separate issues of scope of the agreement, conditions precedent,
and waiver.
The court of appeals easily concluded that the parties could not choose
which state's law applied to the issue of validity of an agreement to arbi-
trate a non-compete clause. The choice of law clause failed the first
prong of section 187 because "enforceability of the employment contract
addendum is not an issue which the parties could have resolved by an
explicit provision in their agreement. '62 The clause failed the second
prong because Texas law, which would have applied absent the choice of
law clause,63 has a fundamental policy disfavoring non-compete clauses. 64
Thus, any state's law that would favor such clauses would violate a funda-
mental policy of Texas law.
On its face, the Turford court's analysis seems sound. Generally, par-
ties cannot contractually resolve the issue of a contract's validity and,
thus, they cannot contractually choose the law on that issue. Also, to the
extent that the validity of a non-compete clause is at issue, the Texas
59. See id. at 643.
60. 793 S.W.2d 670, 681 (Tex. 1990).
61. See id. at 677-78.
62. Turford, 952 S.W.2d at 642-43.
63. The court of appeals merely stated this conclusion without analysis. See id. at 643.
("Texas law would govern the agreement absent a choice of law clause").
64. See id. "The law governing enforcement of non-competition agreements is funda-
mental policy in Texas." See id. at 643 (citing DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d of 681).
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Supreme Court, in the teeth of legislation directly to the contrary, desper-
ately clings to the fiction that Texas law has a clear public policy against
such agreements. 65 But, despite this surface appeal, the court's logic is
flawed in several respects.
First, only one issue before the court of appeals challenged the validity
of the parties' agreement. The employee's remaining three issues did not
touch on validity of the agreement. Indeed, all the other issues assumed
the validity of the agreement. And, the court ultimately disposed of the
case based on one of those other issues - whether the employer had
waived its right to arbitrate.
The Turford court never explained why it did not perform a separate
choice for law analysis for each issue. While some states characterize an
entire case and choose the applicable law based on that characterization,
the Second Restatement specifically rejects this approach.66 Rather, the
Second Restatement instructs courts to choose the applicable law issue by
issue. To do so, the court of appeals should have applied section 187 to
the other three issues, or at least to the issue it used to dispose of the
case-waiver of arbitration.
Second, it is unclear why the court of appeals brought the non-compete
clause into the section 187 analysis. All of the employee's issues dealt
with arbitration, not non-compete clauses. Under the second prong of the
section 187 test, then, the court should have asked whether Texas law (the
state whose law would apply absent the contractual choice of law) had a
policy favoring or disfavoring arbitration agreements, not non-compete
agreements. If the court had done so, it would have found Texas
Supreme Court decisions favoring the enforcement of agreements to arbi-
trate. Also, on the issue of waiver of arbitration agreements, as even the
Turford court notes, Texas applies "a strong presumption against
waiver. '67 Thus, by shifting the focus of its choice of law analysis from
arbitration agreements to non-compete clauses, the court of appeals
shifted from a Texas policy that favored the employer in this case (a pro-
arbitration policy) to one that favored the employee in this case (an anti-
non-compete policy).
Third, as the Turford court implicitly admits, its confused choice of law
analysis is really beside the point because both Texas and Michigan law
yield the same result. In Texas, arbitration is waived if the party seeking
arbitration "acted inconsistently with the arbitration agreement and
that.., conduct prejudiced" the other party.68 In Michigan, arbitration is
waived when the party seeking arbitration "acts inconsistently with that
right [to arbitration], and prejudice to the other party results. '69 The
rules are substantially the same. Of course, this should have been the
65. The Texas Supreme Court's torturing of Texas legislation on non-compete agree-
ments would make even the most cynical legal realist blush.
66. See SECOND RESTATEMENT § 187.





threshold determination-why do a choice of law analysis if the issue will
not affect the outcome of the case? Thus, strictly speaking, the Turford
court's entire choice of law analysis was dicta.
Turford is an example of how choice of law analysis can go awry. In-
stead of rigorously analyzing the issues in proper order, the analysis
jumps from point to point without focus. As a result, we do not quite
know what lessons to take away from the case.
C. CONTRACT ISSUES
In Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co. v. Nishika Ltd.,70 the Texas
Supreme Court applied the Second Restatement to a suit for breach of
express and implied warranties. 71 Specifically, the suit arose among four
companies that participated in the business of three-dimensional photog-
raphy. Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co., better known as 3M,
provided a product known as an emulsion to be used in the developing
process. 72 The other three companies sued in Texas state court, claiming
that 3M's emulsion was defective and caused them damages (largely lost
profits). Specifically, the question was whether the express and implied
warranties applicable to 3M's product benefited only the immediate pur-
chaser of its goods, or whether the warranties extended to subsequent
users of the product. The trial court and the court of appeals concluded
that Minnesota law applied to this dispute, and the Texas Supreme Court
reviewed that issue.
At the outset, of course, the supreme court noted that Texas applies the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws to choice of law issues. 73
Given that the case involved contract issues, the supreme court first fo-
70. 953 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1997).
71. See id. at 736.
72. The factual background of the case is described more fully in the Texas Supreme
Court's opinion certifying questions of law to the Minnesota Supreme Court. The Texas
Supreme Court announced its decision that Minnesota law applied to the case and certified
the applicable questions to the Minnesota Supreme Court. See Minnesota Mining and Mfg.
Co. v. Nishika Ltd., 955 S.W.2d 853, 853-54 (Tex. 1996). The Texas Supreme Court de-
ferred an explanation of its choice of law decision until after receiving an answer from the
Minnesota Supreme Court. See id. at 857-58. The opinion discussed above contains that
explanation.
73. Since Minnesota Mining involved a sales of goods transaction covered by Article 2
of the UCC, one might rightly ask why the court did not turn to section 1.105 of the Texas
UCC as the applicable choice of law rule. See supra notes 42, 44, and 45 and accompanying
text (discussing role of section 1.105 in Texas choice of law analysis). While the supreme
court did not address this point, a logical explanation exists. The specific issue in Minne-
sota Mining was whether express and implied warranties under the UCC extend to users of
the product other than the initial buyer. Section 2-318 of the UCC offers three different
approaches to this question: privity required, no privity required, and leave the issue to
judicial resolution. The Texas UCC adopts the third approach, leaving the issue to Texas
state courts. See TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 2.318 (Vernon 1994) ("These matters
are left to the courts for their determination."). Who may sue on an express or implied
warranty, then, is not a matter covered by the UCC, but rather is a matter covered by the
contract case law of Texas. And, as the Texas Supreme Court held in DeSantis, the Second
Restatement provides the general choice of law rules for contract cases. DeSantis, 793
S.W.2d 670, 677-79 (Tex. 1990).
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cused on section 188 of the Second Restatement, which directs considera-
tion of the following factors:
(a) the place of contracting;
(b) the place of negotiation;
(c) the place of performance;
(d) the location of the contract's subject matter; and
(e) the parties' domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorpora-
tion, and place of business. 74
In terms of these factors, Minnesota was the place of contracting and
negotiation; 3M partially performed its obligations in Minnesota "by de-
veloping, producing, and testing" 75 its product there; and Minnesota is
the place of domicile and principal place of business for 3M. Even
though the three other companies had contacts with five additional
states,76 the supreme court explained that the Minnesota contacts were
the most important "because of their relevance to domestic warranty law
and the policies underlying that law."'77 While the supreme court did not
explain this point, it is presumably so because the acts of negotiating and
making the contract create the contractual relationship to which the ex-
press and implied warranties attach. Also, express and implied warran-
ties look to a certain quality of goods, which are the product of the
seller's performance. For these reasons, the place of negotiation, con-
tracting, and part performance are logically connected to the seller's ex-
press and implied warranties.78
After analyzing the specific factors in section 188, the supreme court
turned to the general factors of section 6 of the Second Restatement. The
supreme court found that these factors were a wash. Most significantly,
the policies of the two primary jurisdictions, Minnesota and Nevada, were
equally implicated. The specific issue involved-whether the seller's war-
ranties protect only those in privity with the seller, or instead extend to
other foreseeable users of the product-is addressed in section 2-318 of
the Uniform Commercial Code, which offers three different resolutions
of the issue. 79 Although Minnesota and Nevada enacted different ver-
sions of section 2-318, both states had the same goal: "to strike a balance
between the competing interests of manufacturers and consumers."80
Since in this case the manufacturer (3M) was located in Minnesota, and
74. SECOND RESTATEMENT § 188(2). The parties had not made a contractual choice
of law. If they had done so, the supreme court would of first have to have addressed
whether it should honor the parties' choice.
75. Minnesota Mining, 953 S.W.2d at 736.
76. See id. ("This case involves contacts in at least seven jurisdictions: Minnesota, Ne-
vada, Oklahoma, Georgia, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Italy."). Also, one of the other com-
panies used 3M's product in Nevada. See id.
77. Id.
78. See GXG, Inc. v. Texacal Oil & Gas, 977 S.W.2d 403, 408 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1998, pet. denied) (relying on place of negotiation, formation, and performance of
contract to hold that Texas law applied to contract issues).
79. See supra note 73 and accompanying text (describing UCC's approaches to
whether privity is required to sue on implied or express warranties).
80. Minnesota Mining, 953 S.W.2d at 736-37 (emphasis added).
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one of the consumers was located in Nevada, this case equally implicated
the policies behind both states' laws.8 1 Because the section 6 factors did
not favor either state, the supreme court followed the section 188 prefer-
ence for Minnesota law.82
The Beaumont court of appeals made a similar analysis in In re Estate
of Rhymer.8 3 Rhymer involved a contract made through a home solicita-
tion. Both Texas and California, the two potentially applicable jurisdic-
tions, had statutes that provided a time period to rescind contracts made
during a home solicitation. The question was which state's statute
applied.
The court first applied the section 188 factors. These factors favored
California as it was the place of negotiation, contracting, and perform-
ance.s 4 Next, the court explained that the section 6 factors also pointed
to California.8 5 Most significantly, the policy underlying both the Texas
and California statutes was to protect their respective citizens from the
pressure of home solicitations.8 6 Since the solicitation took place in Cali-
fornia, the transaction implicated the policy underlying the California
statute, not the Texas statute.8 7 Based on these factors, the court held
that California law applied to the dispute.
II. FORUM NON CONVENIENS
The general principle of forum non conveniens in Texas is that
although a court properly has jurisdiction to resolve a dispute which in-
volves a claim that arose outside of the state, the court nevertheless, in
the exercise of "sound judicial discretion," resists the imposition of its
jurisdiction on such litigation.88 The legislature recently added statutory
factors which must be considered by a court in deciding a forum non con-
veniens motion. Those factors are:
(1) an alternative forum exists in which the claim or action may be
tried;
(2) the alternate forum provides an adequate remedy;
(3) maintenance of the claim or action in the courts of this state
would work a substantial injustice to the moving party;
81. See id.
82. See id. at 738.
83. 969 S.W.2d 126 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1998, no pet.). The federal district court
relied on the same factors in its choice of law analysis of a contract case. Barnes v. Forest
Hills Inv., Inc., 11 F. Supp. 2d 699, 703 (E.D. Tex. 1998). The court chose Texas law be-
cause Texas was the place of negotiation, making, and performance of the contract. Id. at
704.
84. See In re Estate of Thomas Boyd Rhymer, 969 S.W.2d 126, 128 (Tex. App.-Beau-
mont 1998, no pet.).
85. See id.
86. See id. at 129.
87. See id.
88. See Flaiz v. Moore, 359 S.W.2d 872 (Tex. 1962); In re Smith Barney, 975 S.W.2d
593, 595-96 (Tex. 1998). See generally McDONALD & CARLSON, TEXAS PRAcricE GUIDE
§§ 3.16[a] and 3.19.
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(4) the alternate forum, as a result of the submission of the parties
or otherwise, can exercise jurisdiction over all defendants prop-
erly joined to the plaintiff's claim;
(5) the balance of the private interests of the parties and the public
interest of the state predominate in favor of the claim or action
being brought in an alternate forum; and
(6) the stay or dismissal would not result in unreasonable duplica-
tion or proliferation of litigation.8 9
The Texas Supreme Court; has set out similar factors relevant to a fo-
rum non conveniens determination. 90 Presumably, the common law fac-
tors continue to be effective only for non-residents of the U.S. who bring
an action in Texas.91 A plaintiff from outside Texas may only bring an
action in Texas "if the action is begun in this state within the time pro-
vided by the laws of the foreign state or country in which the wrongful
act, neglect or default took place."' 92 Also, the law of the foreign state
must permit the plaintiff to bring their cause of action in the foreign state
both in law and within in the state's statute of limitations.93 This borrow-
ing statute permits courts to dismiss for forum non conveniens actions
where the plaintiff's suit is barred by the plaintiff's state of residence.
In Robinson v. TCI/US West Communications, Inc.,94 the Fifth Circuit
held that the failure to include a return jurisdiction clause in a dismissal
pursuant to forum non conveniens was an abuse of discretion. The Fifth
Circuit, quoting an earlier opinion, stated that "if the district court de-
cides that the [public and private interest factors] favor trial in a foreign
forum, it must finally ensure that a plaintiff can reinstate his suit in the
alternative forum without undue inconvenience or prejudice and that if
the defendant obstructs such reinstatement in the alternative forum that
the plaintiff may return to the American forum." 95 This return jurisdic-
tion clause could prove important for litigators using the new provisions
of the Texas forum non conveniens statute. 96 Section 71.051(c) of the
Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code permits a trial court to set condi-
tions, such as a return jurisdiction clause, in a forum non conveniens dis-
89. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.051(b) (Vernon 1997).
90. See Flaiz, 359 S.W.2d at 874 (citing Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947))("(1) the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (2) the availability of compulsory
process for attendance of unwilling witnesses; (3) the enforceability of a judgment if one is
obtained; (4) the burden imposed upon the citizens and court of Texas in trying a case hat
has no relation to Texas; (5) the general interest in having localized controversies decided
locally; and (6) the interest in having a diversity case tried in a forum that is familiar with
the law that must govern the action."); Dow Chem. Co. v. Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674, 695-96
(Gonzalez, J., dissenting); see also In re Smith Barney, 975 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. 1998).
91. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 71.051(a).
92. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.031 (a)(3) and 71.052 (Vernon 1997)(as-
bestos claimants "borrowing statute").
93. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.031 (a)(]) and (2) (Vernon 1997).
94. 117 F.3d 900 (5th Cir. 1997). See Tjontvet v. Den Norske Bank ASA, 997 F. Supp.
799, 804-07 (S.D. Tex. 1998) (factors used in determining a federal forum non conveniens
motion).
95. Robinson, 117 F.3d at 907 (citing In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans,
Louisiana, 821 F.2d, 1147, 1166 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc)).
96. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.051 (Vernon 1997).
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missal. Texas litigants should benefit from using the Robinson principle
of having a return clause in the forum non conveniens order because
without this defendants may evade jurisdiction of the foreign courts and
may also try to evade discovery or service of process in those foreign
courts.
In In re Smith Barney, Inc.,97 the Texas Supreme Court overruled H.
Rouw Co. v. Railway Express Agency.98 H. Rouw, a supreme court opin-
ion by virtue of "writ refused" designation, stood for the proposition that
corporations qualified to do business in Texas cannot be dismissed on the
basis of forum non conveniens.99 Smith Barney was before the court of
review of a mandamus petition. Accordingly, the supreme court did not
review the merits of the relater's motion for dismissal for forum non con-
veniens. Rather, the supreme court used the opportunity to add reason
to Texas' forum non conveniens jurisprudence by holding corporations
qualified to do business in Texas who sue in Texas may dismissed for fo-
rum non conveniens doctrine. As Justice Hecht noted, "It simply makes
no sense to allow foreign corporations an absolute right to sue non-resi-
dents in Texas courts when individuals have never been accorded the
same right." 100
In Smith Barney, plaintiff brought suit in Texas alleged a Texas Corpo-
ration whose principal place of business was in New York, Smith Barney
agreed to form a joint venture to bid for selection as manager of 15 na-
tional investment funds created by the Republic of Poland as part of its
mass privatization program to sell state-owned enterprises to private in-
vestors and "wrongfully withdrew from the venture and that as a result,
the venture's bid to become an investment fund manager ceased to be
viable."' 01 Smith Barney moved to dismiss the case for forum non con-
veniens arguing that New York was a more appropriate forum because all
the events and alleged wrong doings occurred in New York or Poland,
and all the witnesses resided in New York, Poland, or Great Britain.
Plaintiff argued H. Rouw did not permit the court to dismiss for forum
non conveniens because plaintiff was a Texas corporation. The trial court
denied Smith Barney's motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens.
Smith Barney sought mandamus relief from the denial of this motion.
The supreme court granted relief and overruled H. Rouw and held Texas
corporations may be dismissed for forum non conveniens.
III. PERSONAL JURISDICTION
In Stroman Realty, Inc. v. Antt,10 2 the district court held there was juris-
diction over the states of Florida and California in an injunction action
97. 975 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. 1998).
98. 154 S.W.2d 143 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1941, writ ref'd).
99. See id. at 145; '21' Int'l Holdings, Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 856 S.W.2d 479,
481 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1993, no writ).
100. Smith Barney, 975 S.W.2d at 597-98.
101. Id. at 594.
102. 20 F. Supp. 2d 1050 (S.D. Tex. 1998).
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where the plaintiff sought to enjoin Florida and California from enforcing
their regulations on him in Texas.10 3 Plaintiff operated land fills in Flor-
ida and California. Florida and California said that there is no personal
jurisdiction over them because "enforcement of their statutes against
Stroman occurr[ed] within their state, they do not have minimum contact
with Texas."' 104 The district court called this "disingenuous sophistry"' 0 5
and found specific jurisdiction over California and Florida. In this case,
California sent cease-and-desist orders to the plaintiff in Texas, and Flor-
ida had written letters to the plaintiff in Texas demanding a release of
documents. The court called this "part of a deliberate effort to exert [the
state's] authority in Texas.""1 6
The district court did not agree with California's jurisdictional argu-
ment that a Texas federal court had no jurisdiction over it. After quoting
from the California Department of Real Estate's web site, the court said,
"[a]pparently, California has jurisdiction over anyone using the informa-
tion superhighway-the entire worldwide web-but is subject to jurisdic-
tion only within its borders." 107 The district court then observes that
California and Florida cannot "have their cake and eat it too" 10 8 when
they argue that they can regulate the plaintiff while he is in Texas for
landfills in their state, but yet, they are not subject to jurisdiction in Texas
when the Texas plaintiff seeks to attack the regulations in a Houston fed-
eral court. As the court stated, "A federal court sitting in Houston is a
reasonably logical place to litigate a federal constitutional question aris-
ing from [Florida and California's} attempt to impose their power on a
Texas resident."' 0 9
In Gorman v. Grand Casino of Louisiana, Inc.-Coushatta, 0 the
Grand Casino Coushatta was sued because allegedly the security guards
at the casino had placed a date-rape drug in the plaintiff's drink and sub-
sequently made sexual advances towards her. Grand Casino Coushatta
objected to Texas jurisdiction stating it neither resided in nor had suffi-
cient minimum contact with Texas. The court, while noting that Grand
Casino Coushatta had a "wide-spread regional advertising" ' l in Texas,
found the plaintiff's allegations did not arise by the gambling activities
promoted on the advertisements. Accordingly, there was no specific ju-
risdiction to hold jurisdiction over Grand Casino Coushatta in Texas. The
district court next analyzed whether this wide-spread "continuous and
systematic"112 advertisement of Grand Casino Coushatta in Texas would
give the court general jurisdiction over Grand Casino Coushatta. The
103. See id. at 1052.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1053.
107. Id. at 1054.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1053.
110. 1 F. Supp. 2d 656 (E.D. Tex. 1998).
111. Id. at 658.
112. Id. at 659.
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district court held Grand Casino Coushatta's targeted advertising to Tex-
ans was evidence of continuous and systematic contact with Texas such
that Grand Casino Coushatta could "reasonably expect to be haled into
court" in Texas. 113 Jurisdiction in Texas did not offend notions of fair
play and substantial justice because: (1) Beaumont is just across the state
line from Louisiana, and (2) Texas had a legitimate interest in this suit
where a Texas resident was allegedly enticed to the casino by Grand Ca-
sino Coushatta's advertising that is targeted to Texans.11 4
In Thompson v. Handa-Lopez, Inc.,115 the district court had to decide
whether there was jurisdiction over a California corporation which oper-
ated an Internet casino game. The defendant argued that the district
court had no personal jurisdiction over it because the server's principal
place of business, being the corporation, is located in California. The
plaintiff responded, and the court agreed, that minimum contacts existed
with Texas because the defendant "advertised its casino over the Internet
knowing that Texas citizens [would] see its advertisement. Further [the
defendant] has conducted business within the State of Texas by entering
into contacts with Texas citizens to play those games, which the Texas
citizens played while in Texas. 1' ' 6 The defendant next argued that a
clause in his contract, which stated that any dispute would be governed by
the laws of the State of California and "shall be resolved exclusively by
final and binding arbitration in the City of San Jose, County of Santa
Clara, State of California" 117 does not satisfy the fair play and substance
justice clause of the personal jurisdiction formula. The court dismissed
this argument by stating that these contractual provisions were not a fo-
rum selection clause because they do not mandate that all disputes be
resolved in California, nor that the arbitration be conducted or that a
lawsuit be filed in California. The court also noted that Texas had a
strong interest in protecting citizens which had been defrauded.
In another Internet case, Mieczkowski v. Masco Corp.,118 the federal
district court held it had general jurisdiction over a manufacturer of a
bunk bed because of the manufacturer's Internet web site.119 The district
court found general jurisdiction even though: "(1) [the defendant] has no
offices in Texas; (2) it has no employees in Texas; (3) it has no registered
agent in Texas; (4) it has no real or personal property, including ware-
houses in Texas; and (5) it does not local advertising in Texas. ' 120 The
court analyzed Masco's web site using the three-prong analysis from
Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc.121 According to Zippo, "At one
end of the spectrum are those situations where a defendant.., enter into
113. Id.
114. See id.
115. 998 F. Supp. 738 (W.D. Tex. 1998).
116. Id. at 743.
117. Id. at 744 (quoting contract language).
118. 997 F. Supp. 782, 785 (E.D. Tex. 1998).
119. See id. at 787-88.
120. Id. at 785.
121. 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
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contacts with residents"1 22 by way of the Internet and downloads, trans-
mits, or exchanges files. In these cases, the exercise of personal jurisdic-
tion will almost always be proper.1 23 On the other end of the spectrum
are those cases in which the defendant has done nothing more than ad-
vertise on the Internet.124 Such web sides have called "passive" cites. -1
25
In cases dealing with this type of activity, courts have found that personal
jurisdiction cannot be exercised.' 26 In the middle of the spectrum, one
finds the web sites that allow the parties to exchange information with the
host computer (the person or company maintaining the web site). In
these cases, where the jurisdiction can be exercised is determined by ex-
amining the "level of interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange
of information."' 127 The district court concluded that Masco's website is
in the middle ground of cases and thoroughly examines Masco's website
to determine if jurisdiction is proper. Combining the defendant's pres-
ence on its web site and its corporate sales to Texas, constituted enough
evidence for the court to find general jurisdiction over Masco such that it
should reasonably anticipate being haled into court in Texas.
In Rowland & Rowland, P.C. v. Texas Employers Indem. Co., 128 the
Austin court of appeals held there was specific jurisdiction over a Tennes-
see law firm that represented a Texas client who was killed by a rock slide
in Cumberland County, Tennessee. His widow originally filed a success-
ful workers' compensation claim for death benefits against Texas Em-
ployers Indemnity Co. (TEIC). At the conclusion of the Workers'
Compensation suit, the Texas trucker's family brought a wrongful death
action against the State of Tennessee, with Rowland & Rowland as the
family's Tennessee lawyers. During the litigation TEIC informed Row-
land & Rowland of its subrogation interest in the wrongful death action.
In holding there was specific jurisdiction over TEIC's suit against Row-
land and Rowland for its subrogation interest, the court of appeals deter-
mined that TEIC relied upon a series of letters between Rowland &
Rowland and TEIC that stated the Tennessee law firm would protect
TEIC's subrogation claim. TEIC, consequently, did not assert its claim in
the Tennessee action. An additional factor in determining that Rowland
& Rowland had specific jurisdiction was the distribution of a "substantial
portion" of the $217,000 award from Tennessee to Texas residents. The
court determined it was these specific contacts that gave rise to TEIC's
subrogation claim against Rowland and Rowland and that these contacts
are sufficient, purposeful, minimum contacts with Texas to satisfy due
process.





127. Id. at 1124.
128. 973 S.W.2d 432 (Tex. App.-Austin 1998, no pet. h.).
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In James v. Illinois Central Railroad Co.,129 the appellant had filed a
personal injury suit in Harris County against Illinois Central as a result of
an accident that occurred in Memphis, Tennessee. Illinois Central is a
Delaware corporation whose principal place of business is located in Chi-
cago, Illinois. Illinois Central leases an office in Harris County for one
employee. This lone employee coordinates the supply of Illinois Cen-
tral's services to its customers over a five state region. This employee and
his duties allowed the court to conclude Illinois Central is "doing busi-
ness" 130 in Texas. Personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant
may be asserted if: "(1) the requirement of the Texas long-arm statute are
fulfilled, and (2) the exercise of jurisdiction complies with the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion."1 31 Once the court determined Illinois Central was doing business
in Texas, it turned to the federal constitutional requirements of personal
jurisdiction: whether the defendant has purposely established minimum
contacts with the forum state and if so, does the maintenance of the suit
offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. ' 132 Illinois
Central did not dispute it generated $75 million of business in Harris
County, operated railroad tracks in Texas and most importantly to the
court, "continuous[ly] operat[ed] ... an office in Harris County that em-
ploys an agent of Illinois Central. ' 133 This operation of a sales office in
Harris County permitted the court to hold Illinois Central had purpose-
fully availed itself of the laws of Texas and it "had sufficient minimum
contracts with Texas to support jurisdiction."' 34
Even though the court noted that "it [is] rare when jurisdiction will not
comport with fair play and substantial justice once minimum contacts
analysis has been satisfied,"1135 the court reasoned that "the assertion of
personal jurisdiction over Illinois Central would offend concepts of fair
play and substantial justice"' 36 because Texas has no interest in adjudicat-
ing this suit.
The dissent properly chastised the majority for not following estab-
lished Texas precedent which would allow jurisdiction in Texas courts.137
The dissent noted, forum non conveniens would have been more appro-
priate.' 38 Forum non conveniens is decided after jurisdiction is asserted.
This procedure, if granted, would have permitted the parties to transfer
their dispute to Memphis.
129. 965 S.W.2d 594 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no pet.).
130. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.042 (Vernon 1997).
131. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 965 S.W.2d at 596 (citing CSR Ltd. v. Link, 925 S.W.2d 591,
594 (Tex. 1996)).
132. Id. at 597 (citing CSR Ltd., 925 S.W.2d at 594).
133. Id. (The court specifically noted that "this office solicits business from citizens of
this state and generates substantial amounts of income.").
134. Id. at 599.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See id. at 602.
138. See id. at 603.
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IV. FULL FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE
The U.S. Constitution states that "[F]ull faith and credit shall be given
in each state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every
other state."' 39 The Full Faith and Credit Act 41 provides that "judicial
proceedings of any state shall have the same full faith and credit in every
court within the United States ... as they have by law or usage in the
court of such state ... from which they are taken."'141 The U.S. Supreme
Court has determined that "federal courts may not 'employ their own
rules ... in determining the effect of state judgments,' but must 'accept
the rule chosen by the state from which the judgment is taken."1 42
Similarly, Chapter 35 of the Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code
provides that after a party files a "foreign judgment" with the clerk of any
court of competent jurisdiction it is subject to the same procedures in
Texas and proceedings for reopening, vacating, staying, enforcing or satis-
fying a judgment, as a judgment of the court in which it is filed.' 43
In Stafford v. True Temper Sports,144 the court of appeals reaffirmed
that state administrative proceedings which have been reviewed or are
reviewable by a state district court have preclusive effect, 145 and that a
federal court can apply state rules for issue preclusion in determining
whether a matter litigated in state court may be relitigated in federal
court.146
Challenges to foreign judgments filed under the Uniform Enforcement
of Foreign Judgments Act (UEFJA) are generally in the nature of post-
judgment proceedings because the filing of the judgment instantly creates
a judgment enforceable in Texas. As a result, a motion to contest the
recognition of a foreign judgment will operate as a motion for new trial.
The court in Dear v. Russo147 held that in order to meet the burden
under the UEFJA, to establish the finality of a judgment, a party must:
(1) file a facially final foreign judgment; or (2) make a separate showing
that he judgment was final.' 48 The filing of a final judgment under
UEFJA, "has the effect of initiating an enforcement proceeding and in-
stantly rendering a final judgment in Texas."'1 49 Because the judgment in
Dear did not facially appear to be a final judgment under the law of Ohio,
the rendering state, the appellant bore the burden to establish that the
judgment was, in fact, valid and enforceable in Texas.1 50
139. U.S. CONST. amend. IV, § 1.
140. 28 U.S.C. § 17.38 (1998).
141. Id.
142. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 373 (1996) (citing
Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp, 456 U.S. 461, 481-82 (1982)).
143. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 35 (Vernon 1997).
144. 123 F.3d 291 (5th Cir. 1997).
145. See id. at 294.
146. See id.
147. 973 S.W.2d 445 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1998, no pet. h.).
148. See id. at 446-47.
149. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 35.003.
150. See Dear, 973 S.W.2d at 445.
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In determining the res judicata effect of a bankruptcy court determina-
tion, federal not state res judicata applies. In Blum v. Restland of Dal-
las,15 the court of appeals held that "a bankruptcy judgment bars a
subsequent suit if: (1) both cases involve the same parties; (2) the prior
judgment was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the prior
decision was a final judgment on the merits; and (4) the same cause of
action is at issue in both cases."' 52 The court noted that finality "is inter-
preted more liberally in bankruptcy cases then in others"'153 and that final
order of a bankruptcy court "is res judicata of all issues that were or could
have been litigated in that action. ' 154 Further, "the Fifth Circuit has
adopted the transactional test to determine if two cases involved the same
causes of action for res judicata purposes.' 55 The critical issue under
that test is "whether the actions are based on the same nucleus of opera-
tive facts. The [federal] doctrine of res judicata operates to bar all claims
arising from the same nucleus of operative facts that could have been
brought in the previous lawsuit, not only those claims that actually were
brought."1 56.
151. 971 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1997, pet. denied).
152. Id. at 550.
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